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Monitoring with implicated punishment is common in human societies to avert freeriding on common goods.
But is it effective in promoting public cooperation? We show that the introduction of monitoring and implicated
punishment is indeed effective, as it transforms the public goods game to a coordination game, thus rendering
cooperation viable in infinite and finite well-mixed populations. We also show that the addition of within-group
enforcement further promotes the evolution of public cooperation. However, although the group size in this
context has nonlinear effects on collective action, an intermediate group size is least conductive to cooperative
behaviour. This contradicts recent field observations, where an intermediate group size was declared optimal
with the conjecture that group-size effects and within-group enforcement are responsible. Our theoretical re-
search thus clarifies key aspects of monitoring with implicated punishment in human societies, and additionally,
it reveals fundamental group-size effects that facilitate prosocial collective action.
Public cooperation is imperative for the sustainable man-
agement of common resources in human societies [1–3].
However, human cooperation is threatened by temptations
that are rooted in selfish but lucrative short-term benefits on
offer when defecting or free-riding on the efforts of others
[4]. Like rewarding [5–9], punishment is often employed
for maintaining sufficiently high levels of public cooperation
[10–19]. In addition to individual efforts aimed at punish-
ing free-riders [20–25], our societies are home to a plethora
of sanctioning institutions [26, 27]. In particular, during the
last decade peer and pool punishment have been studied the-
oretically and experimentally as possible means to stabilize
cooperation [20, 21, 26, 28–36].
Although ample research efforts have already been invested
to inform on the subtleties of positive and negative reciprocity
and their role in promoting public cooperation [11], few stud-
ies have thus far considered implicated punishment despite
it being and integral cog in various sanctioning systems in
human societies. In general, the implementation of impli-
cated punishment means that once a wrongdoer is caught,
all the group members are punished, no matter whether the
group members are cooperators or defectors. Such punish-
ment schemes are particularly common for monitoring [37]
the management of common resources on large scales. For
example, in Nature Reserve of China, an administrative bu-
reau is responsible for monitoring all illegal activities. When
the bureau staff members detect an illegal activity in the mon-
itored parcel, all households within the group will suffer the
same fine [14]. While the system may work in practice, in
theory it is still unclear how fines affect cooperators that are
adversely affected, and how the overall dynamics plays out in
favor of prosocial behaviour.
In addition to the well-known and important adverse effects
that emerge if cooperators are sanctioned [38, 39], some indi-
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viduals in the group may act emotionally and exploit options
related to within-group enforcement [32, 40–42], for example
resorting to probabilistic peer punishment [43]. It is thus also
of interest to consider whether the addition of probabilistic
within-group enforcement can further enhance the evolution
of cooperation in the presence of monitoring and implicated
punishment. In fact, a recent study based on field observations
found that an intermediate group size is optimal for public co-
operation when both implicated punishment and within-group
enforcement are present [14]. However, there is no theoreti-
cal research available that would support the conjecture that
group-size effects and within-group enforcement are respon-
sible for the success of implicated punishment.
In this paper, we therefore consider a public goods game
with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement in
infinite and finite well-mixed populations. Our goal is to de-
velop a thorough theoretical understanding behind the success
of implicated punishment, and the role within-group enforce-
ment and group size play in either supporting or impairing the
evolution of public cooperation. As we will show, implicated
punishment transforms the public goods game into a coordi-
nation game, and within-group enforcement further promotes
the emergence of prosocial collective action. Contrary to field
observations [14], however, theory fails to predict an optimal
intermediate group size for the evolution of cooperation. In-
stead, we find that an intermediate group size is actually not
beneficial for the successful evolution of cooperation. Our re-
search thus clarifies key aspects of monitoring with implicated
punishment in human societies, and it also reveals fundamen-
tal group-size effects that may promote a public agenda.
Results
We consider a well-mixed population, in which individuals
engage in a public goods game [44], where each individual
is able to cooperate or to defect, respectively. In each group,
N players are chosen randomly to form a group for playing
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FIG. 1: The gradient of selection in dependence on the fraction of
cooperators in infinite populations. Stable equilibria are depicted
with solid circles, while unstable equilibria are depicted with open
circles. Arrows indicate the expected direction of evolution. Cooper-
ation is favored over defection when the arrow points to the right.
When the maximal possible average fine for a defector Fmax =
dp + pq(N − 1)β ≤ (1 − r/N)c, the public good dilemma still
exists with full defection as the only stable equilibrium (a). Other-
wise, the public good game is transformed into a coordination game
with full cooperation and full defection as the two stable equilibria
(b). Parameter values are: N = 5, r = 3, c = 1, d = 1.0, p = 0.1,
α = 0.3, β = 1.0, and q = 0.5 in (a); N = 5, r = 3, c = 1,
d = 1.0, p = 0.5, α = 0.3, β = 1.0, and q = 0.5 in (b).
the game. Cooperators contribute the cost c, while defectors
contribute nothing. The sum of all contributions in the group
is multiplied by the enhancement factor r > 1, and then split
evenly among all group members. After choosing the strategy,
the group’s behaviours will be monitored with a probability p
(0 < p < 1). If it is detected that there is at least one defec-
tor in the group, then the implicated punishment mechanism
will work, and accordingly each individual will incur a fine
d (d > 0). Otherwise, there is no monitoring, and there is
no fine on any individual. But once the implicated punish-
ment is implemented in the group, it may trigger the within-
group enforcement. Accordingly, each cooperator (if present)
will use the peer punishment on defectors with a probability q
(0 < q < 1), and is designated as a punisher. Peer punishers
impose a fine β on each defector at a cost α (0 < α < β).
Below, we study how the introduction of implicated punish-
ment and within-group enforcement influences the evolution-
ary dynamics of cooperation both in infinite and finite well-
mixed population, in particular the effects of group size in the
model, by theoretical and numerical analysis. We emphasize
that the social dilemma only exists when r < N in the public
goods game [44, 45], so in this study the interval of r values
is constrained as 1 < r < N .
We first present the gradient of selection x˙ given by the
replicator equation (Methods for infinite populations) for
studying the evolution of cooperative behaviour in infinite
populations, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Here, x is the fraction
of all the cooperators in the infinite population. We show that
there exist two typical behaviours for the gradient of selec-
tion varying with the fraction of cooperators, as presented in
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FIG. 2: The stationary fraction of cooperators and gradient of se-
lection in infinite populations. The unstable internal equilibrium (if
present) dividing the system into two basins of attraction is indicated
by dash line and also by open circles, and the cooperative basin of
attraction is indicated by blue arrows. The stable boundary equilib-
rium is indicated by solid circles, while the unstable boundary equi-
librium is indicated by open circles. The gradient of selection in the
areas above the dash line is positive, while the gradient of selection
in the areas below the dash line is negative. And the magnitude of
the gradient of selection is shown using the red-green-blue scale in-
dicated, and blue areas indicate parameter combination for which the
fraction of cooperators increase faster. In (a-c), the unstable internal
equilibrium decreases with increasing the monitoring probability p,
the implicated punishment fine d, and the within-group enforcement
probability q, respectively. While in (d) the unstable internal equilib-
rium first increases, then decreases with increasing the group size N .
In other words, increasing p, d, or q enlarges the basin of attraction
of the x = 1 stable state, thus favoring the evolution of cooperation.
Importantly, a small group size or a large group size can lead to a
larger basin of attraction of the x = 1 stable state than an intermedi-
ate group size does. In addition, in the areas above the dash lines, the
rate of increase of the fraction of cooperators depends on the param-
eter values. Parameter values are: N = 5, r = 3, c = 1, d = 1.0,
α = 0.3, β = 1.0, and q = 0.5 in (a); N = 5, r = 3, c = 1,
p = 0.5, α = 0.3, β = 1.0, and q = 0.5 in (b); N = 5, r = 3,
c = 1, p = 0.5, d = 1.0, α = 0.3, and β = 1.0 in (c); r = 3, c = 1,
p = 0.5, d = 1.0, α = 0.3, β = 1.0, and q = 0.5 in (d).
Fig. 1(a) and Fig. 1(b) respectively. We define Fmax as the
maximal fine upon a defector who receives from the two pun-
ishment regimes, dp+pq(N−1)β. We accordingly prove that
if Fmax ≤ (1− r/N)c (Methods for infinite populations), the
gradient of selection is always negative (Fig. 1(a)). Cooper-
ators thus die out regardless of the initial conditions. While
if Fmax > (1 − r/N)c, a new unstable equilibrium emerges
in the x ∈ (0, 1) interval, which divides the system into two
basins of attraction (Fig. 1(b)). Depending on the initial con-
ditions, thus the system will evolve either towards full defec-
tion or towards full cooperation. Both x = 0 and x = 1 are
stable steady states, indicating that the public goods game is
transformed into a coordination game.
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FIG. 3: The gradient of selection in dependence on the fraction of
cooperators in finite populations for different population size. The
gradient of selection exhibits two qualitatively identical behaviours
as reported in Fig. 1. Parameter values are: N = 5, r = 3, c = 1,
p = 0.1, d = 1.0, α = 0.3, β = 1.0, and q = 0.5 in (a); N = 5,
r = 3, c = 1, p = 0.5, d = 1.0, α = 0.3, β = 1.0, and q = 0.5 in
(b).
Furthermore, we investigate how the parameters influence
the stationary fraction of cooperators in the infinite popula-
tion, as shown in Fig. 2. We find that when the monitor-
ing probability p is zero or small, there is always no interior
equilibrium, regardless of the values of other parameters in
Fig. 2(a). When p increases to c(1 − r/N)/[d + q(N − 1)β]
(Methods for infinite populations), an interior equilibrium
which is unstable enters the state space at the point x = 1.
With further increasing p, the interior equilibrium decreases.
In other words, increasing the monitoring probability enlarges
the basin of attraction of the x = 1 steady state. We now
consider the effects of implicated fine d. When d = 0, if
pq(N−1)β > c(1−r/N), then there is an interior equilibrium
(Methods for infinite populations). Otherwise, no interior
equilibrium can emerge. If the interior equilibrium is present,
it decreases with increasing d (Fig. 2(b)), which means that
increasing the implicated fine d also enlarges the basin of at-
traction of the x = 1 steady state. It is necessary to point out
that compared to the increase of p, the increase of d makes the
value of the interior equilibrium decrease much slowly. This
means that the chance of monitoring can result in more pos-
itive effects on the evolution of cooperation than the punish-
ment fine does, when the probabilistic implicated punishment
is considered. In addition, when the probability for within-
group enforcement q is zero, the interior equilibrium presents
if dp > c(1 − r/N) (Methods for infinite populations). Then
it decreases with increasing q, accordingly the basin of attrac-
tion of the x = 1 steady state is enlarged (Fig. 2(c)). Finally,
we investigate the effects of group size N . Interestingly, we
find that if the interior equilibrium is present, it first increases,
reaches a maximum, but then decreases with increasing the
group size (Fig. 2(d)). This means that the basin of attraction
of the x = 1 steady state is smallest at an intermediate group
size. We also find that the interior equilibrium could be absent
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FIG. 4: The internal roots of the gradient of selection G(k) in fi-
nite populations. The roots are normalized by the population size Z.
In (a-c), the values of roots decrease with increasing the monitoring
probability p, the fine of implicated punishment d, and the proba-
bility of within-group enforcement q, respectively. While in (d), the
values first increase, and then decrease with increasing the group size
N . Parameter values are: Z = 200, r = 3, c = 1, N = 5, d = 1.0,
α = 0.3, β = 1.0, and q = 0.5 in (a); Z = 200, r = 3, c = 1,
N = 5, p = 0.5, α = 0.3, β = 1.0, and q = 0.5 in (b); Z = 200,
r = 3, c = 1, N = 5, p = 0.5, α = 0.3, β = 1.0, and d = 1.0 in
(c); Z = 200, r = 3, c = 1, p = 0.5, d = 1.0, α = 0.3, β = 1.0,
and q = 0.5 in (d).
for small group size, depending on the values of other param-
eters. But it will exhibit then when the group size increases to
a certain value (Supplementary Fig. S1). Subsequently, the in-
terior equilibrium decreases with further increasing the group
size, which indicates that the larger the group size, the greater
the basin of attraction of x = 1. This finding is in agree-
ment with previous experimental results in [46]. Furthermore,
we emphasize that no matter how large the values of p, d, q,
and N are, the boundary equilibrium x = 0 is always stable,
which means that the outcome that x = 1 is the only stable
state cannot happen in our model (Methods for infinite popu-
lations).
It is worth pointing out that in line with [14], group size
is found to be able to produce nonlinear effects on collective
action in our study. But being contrary to the field observation,
we find that an intermediate group size cannot lead to the most
favorable outcome for public cooperation. Instead, it could
lead to the smallest basin of attraction of the full cooperation
state, which indicates that an intermediate group size is not
beneficial to the evolution of cooperation when the implicated
punishment and within-group enforcement are incorporated.
In addition, we show the gradient of selection x˙ in Fig. 2,
and indicate that its value in the areas above the dash line is
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FIG. 5: The stationary distribution and the average cooperation level. Top row depicts the stationary distribution in finite populations in
the presence of mutation u = 0.01. In (a-c), the population spends more time in states where cooperators prevail for a larger monitoring
probability p, a larger fine of implicated punishment d, or a larger probability of within-group enforcement q. While in (d) the population
spends more time in states where cooperators thrive for either a small group size or a large group size, and spends less time in states where
cooperators decline for an intermediate group size. Bottom row depicts the average value of cooperation level in the presence of mutation
u = 0.01. In (e-g), the average cooperation level increases with increasing the monitoring probability p, the fine of implicated punishment d,
or the probability of within-group enforcement q. While in (h), the average cooperation level reaches a high value at either a small group size
or a large group size, and reaches a minimum at an intermediate group size. Parameter values are: Z = 50, r = 3, c = 1, N = 5, d = 1.0,
α = 0.3, β = 1.0, and q = 0.5 in (a) and (e); Z = 50, r = 3, c = 1, N = 5, p = 0.5, α = 0.3, β = 1.0, and q = 0.5 in (b) and (f); Z = 50,
r = 3, c = 1, N = 5, p = 0.5, α = 0.3, β = 1.0, and d = 1.0 in (c) and (g); Z = 50, r = 3, c = 1, p = 0.5, d = 1.0, α = 0.3, β = 1.0,
and q = 0.5 in (d) and (h).
positive. If the gradient of selection is positive, the fraction
of cooperators will increase. We see that with increasing the
monitoring probability p, the implicated punishment fine d,
or the within-group enforcement probability q, the gradient of
selection increases in the ares where x˙ > 0. However, in that
area the gradient of selection first decreases, reaches a mini-
mum, but then increases with increasing the group size. But
for a fixed value of p, d, q, or N , the gradient of selection can
always reach the maximum values at an intermediate fraction
of cooperators, which is relatively smaller than x = 1.
Corresponding to the right-hand side of the replicator equa-
tion, we use the gradient of selection G(k) [47, 48] (Methods
for finite populations), to describe the behavioural dynamics
in finite populations. Figure 3 shows two typical behaviours
of G(k) as a function of the fraction of cooperators k/Z for
different sizes Z of finite populations. We find that the two
typical behaviours found in infinite populations are also valid
in finite populations, for any parameter combinations. One
behaviour depicts that G(k) < 0 for any k, which shows
that cooperators are always disadvantageous. The other de-
picts that G(k) has a unique internal root k∗, above which
G(k) > 0. This means that cooperators become advantageous
when k is larger than k∗. In addition, with increasing the pop-
ulation size, the gradient of selection increases. This results
in that the position of the interior root moves from right to left
by increasing the population size. Thus, the range of k/Z in
which cooperators are advantageous is greatly increased for
large populations.
In what follows, we show how the interior root of G(k)
varies with the parameters which have been referred to infi-
nite populations (Fig. 4). We find that when the root exists,
its value monotonically decreases with increasing the mon-
itoring probability p, the implicated sanction fine d, or the
within-group enforcement probability q (Supplementary Fig.
S2(a-c)). This means that the range of k/Z for which coop-
eration is advantageous increases when any one of these three
parameters (p, d, and q) increases. It is worth pointing out that
the value of the interior root decreases much slowly as the im-
plicated punishment fine d increases, and this phenomenon
is also found in infinite populations indicating that the pun-
ishment fine can only provide limited positive effects on co-
operation. While with increasing the group size, the root’s
value first increases, reaches a maximum, but then decreases
again (Fig. 4(d)). This means that the range of k/Z for which
cooperation is advantageous reaches the minimal value at an
intermediate group size. However, the root may be present
only when the group size exceeds a certain value for other
parameter values (Supplementary Fig. S2(d)). With further
5increasing the group size, the root monotonically decreases.
Accordingly, the obtained results in finite population confirm
that an intermediate group size is not optimal for the evolution
of cooperation, but it is certainly not detrimental for coopera-
tion. This in turn indicates that the combined effects of free-
riding and within-group enforcement do not lead to an optimal
intermediate group size, contrary to the conjecture in [14]. In
addition, we emphasize that the root’s value recovers to that
in Fig. 2 when Z → +∞, and the dependence of the root’s
value on these parameters (p, d, q, and N ) is very similar to
those in infinite well-mixed populations.
Another key quantity for describing the evolutionary dy-
namics in finite well-mixed populations is the stationary dis-
tribution in the presence of mutations (Methods for finite pop-
ulations) [49, 50]. In the top row of Fig. 5, we show how the
stationary distribution changes with the four parameters (p, d,
q, and N ), respectively. It is worth pointing out that the sta-
tionary distribution characterizes the pervasiveness in time of
a given configuration of the population. We find that with in-
creasing the monitoring probability p, the implicated sanction
fine d, or the within-group enforcement probability q, the time
that the system spends in the full cooperation state increases.
With the large values of these parameters, the system spends
most of the time in the full cooperation state, leading to max-
ima of the stationary distribution at k = Z . But the time that
the system spends in the full cooperation state does not mono-
tonically increase with increasing the group size. Instead, with
an intermediate group size, the system spends most of the time
in the full defection state, leading to maxima of the stationary
distribution at k = 0. While either a small group size or a
large group size leads to that the system spends most of the
time in the full cooperation state.
In the bottom row of Fig. 5, we further show how the av-
erage value of cooperation level varies with the four param-
eters (p, d, q, and N ), respectively. We find that the average
cooperation level monotonically increases with increasing the
monitoring probability p, the implicated sanction fine d, or the
within-group enforcement probability q. But we observe that
with increasing the group size, it first decreases, reach a min-
imum, then increases again. This means that an intermediate
group size is not beneficial to the evolution of cooperation.
Altogether, Fig. 5 confirms that cooperation is promoted ei-
ther at a small group size or a large group size, rather than an
intermediate group size.
In the Supplementary Information, we also investigate our
model in finite populations with large peer punishment cost α
(Supplementary Fig. S3), and explore the effects of the se-
lection intensity (Supplementary Fig. S4) and the mutation
rates (Supplementary Fig. S5) on the stationary distribution
of cooperation and the average cooperation level. We find that
our results regarding the effects of the monitoring probabil-
ity, the implicated punishment fine, the within-group enforce-
ment probability, and the group size are not changed when the
above variations are considered. In addition, we consider a
discounting factor for the implicated punishment fine on co-
operators (Supplementary Fig. S6). We find that the intro-
duction of the discounting factor does not change the genetic
outcome about the internal root of the gradient of selection
in infinite and finite populations, but can decrease the value of
the internal root, thus increasing the advantage of cooperators.
Discussion
Human cooperation is unique, and it is one of the key pillars
of our evolutionary success. The origins of our remarkable
other-regarding abilities are likely rooted in the mitigation of
between-group conflicts, and in the necessity for alloparental
care during the advent of the genus Homo. In the absence
of such pressing challenges, however, human societies rely
on rewarding and policing to maintain public cooperation [1].
Monitoring with implicated punishment is a special form of
policing, and this form of monitoring and punishment is par-
ticularly common. In this paper, based on an evolutionary
game theoretical model we have studied the monitoring with
implicated punishment and within-group enforcement in infi-
nite and finite well-mixed populations.
As we have emphasized above, our model setup is well
aligned with reality in that implicated punishment and within-
group enforcement are common in human societies, and it
is indeed relatively straightforward to come up with exam-
ples where our model could apply. A good example is the
large-scale management of common resources in general. The
key assumption of implicated punishment is that once a de-
fector within a group is detected, subsequently all members
of that group, regardless of their strategies, are fined. Evi-
dently, it is thus likely that cooperators will be punished too.
As a countermeasure, we have also considered within-group
enforcement through peer punishment. We have shown that
the implicated punishment alone transforms the public goods
game into a coordination game. Accordingly, cooperation
becomes viable, albeit depending somewhat on initial condi-
tions. Adding within-group enforcement to the setup, we have
shown that this further relaxes the necessary conditions for co-
ordinated action to emerge, and thus for public cooperation to
thrive. Moreover, we have confirmed that cooperation can be
enhanced both in infinite and finite well-mixed populations,
thus establishing for the first time mechanisms that underlie
the success of implicated punishment. Our results also indi-
cate that in the probabilistic implicated punishment the fine
has an effect earlier than the monitoring probability for the
evolution of cooperation, but before any monitoring benefits
materialize a sufficient non-zero punishment fine is required.
We hope that this indication about the effects of the punish-
ment fine and the monitoring probability could be helpful for
the policy recommendations in the management of common
resources.
Since the group size has been identified as a crucial fac-
tor affecting collective action [51–55], we have also consid-
ered this aspect of the studied evolutionary game in detail.
In the typical public goods game, the negative effect of free-
riding on cooperation are enhanced by increasing the group
size. But when punishment is introduced into the game, it
has a positive effect on cooperation especially for large group
size [53]. The coexistence of these two opposing factors de-
termines the net effect of the group size, and ultimately the
6combination of free-riding and punishment leads to the group
size having nonlinear effects on collective behaviour. This
is in fact predicted quantitatively by our theoretical analysis,
and is in agreement with a recent field investigation involving
free-riding and within-group enforcement [14]. However, the
difference is that our theoretical results show that an interme-
diate group size is not best for cooperative behaviour, while
the field data show the opposite. Importantly, while the con-
clusions of the field investigation rely solely on the effects of
free-riding and within-group enforcement, and also because
the range of the available group sizes in the field data was
small [14], the two opposing factors predicted by our theoreti-
cal analysis could not have been taken into account. Our study
thus provides further key insights on the intricate interplay be-
tween the group size, within-group enforcement, and impli-
cated punishment. We hope that our in part counterintuitive
results will inspire further theoretical and empirical research
devoted to the mechanisms that are essential for prosocial col-
lective behaviour.
Methods
Evolutionary dynamics in infinite well-mixed populations
For studying the evolutionary dynamics in infinite well-
mixed populations, we use the replicator equation [56]. To
begin, we assume a large population, a fraction x of which is
composed of cooperators, the remaining fraction (1−x) being
defectors. Accordingly, the replicator equation is
x˙ = x(1 − x)(PX − PD), (1)
where PX = qPP +(1− q)PC is the average payoff of all the
cooperators, while PP , PC , and PD are the average payoffs
of punishing cooperators, second-order free riders (coopera-
tors who do not punish), and defectors, respectively. And the
average payoffs PC , PP , and PD are respectively
PC =
N−2∑
i=0
(
N − 1
i
)
xi(1− x)N−1−i[(1 − p)(
i+ 1
N
rc− c) + p(
i + 1
N
rc− c− d)] + xN−1(rc− c)
=
rc
N
+
(N − 1)rcx
N
− c− pd+ dpxN−1,
PP =
N−2∑
i=0
(
N − 1
i
)
xi(1− x)N−1−i{(1− p)(
i+ 1
N
rc− c) + p[
i+ 1
N
rc− c− d− (N − 1− i)α]}
+xN−1(rc − c)
=
rc
N
+
(N − 1)rcx
N
− c− dp+ pα(N − 1)(x− 1) + dpxN−1, and
PD =
N−1∑
i=0
(
N − 1
i
)
xi(1− x)N−1−i · [(1− p)
i
N
rc+ p
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
qj(1 − q)i−j(
i
N
rc− d− jβ)]
=
(N − 1)rcx
N
− dp− pqβ(N − 1)x,
where i denotes the number of all the cooperators among N−
1 co-players in a group, and j (j ≤ i) denotes the number of
punishing cooperators among i cooperators.
With these definitions, the replicator equation has two
boundary equilibria, namely x = 0 and x = 1. Interior equi-
libria, on the other hand, can be determined by the roots of the
function g(x) = PX − PD, thus obtaining
g(x) = dpxN−1+pq(N−1)(α+β)x−pq(N−1)α−c+
rc
N
.
(2)
It follows that g(0) = −c+ rc
N
− pq(N − 1)α < 0 when r <
N . On the other hand, the function g(x) is strictly increasing
since g′(x) = dp(N−1)xN−2+pq(N−1)(α+β) > 0 for x ∈
(0, 1). Accordingly, the interior equilibrium is determined by
g(1) = dp+ pq(N − 1)β − c + rc
N
, from which we have the
following two conclusions:
(1) When dp + pq(N − 1)β > c(1 − r
N
), the replicator
equation has only one interior equilibrium x∗ ∈ (0, 1), but it
is unstable since g′(x∗) > 0. The two boundary equilibria
x = 0 and x = 1 are both stable.
(2) When dp + pq(N − 1)β ≤ c(1 − r
N
), the replicator
equation has no interior equilibria in (0, 1). Only x = 0 is a
stable equilibrium, while x = 1 is an unstable equilibrium.
7Evolutionary dynamics in finite well-mixed populations
For studying the evolutionary dynamics in finite well-mixed
populations, we consider a population of finite size Z . Here,
the average payoffs of second-order free-riders, punishing co-
operators, and defectors in the population with k cooperators
are respectively given by
fC(k) =
(
Z − 1
N − 1
)−1 N−2∑
i=0
(
k − 1
i
)(
Z − k
N − i− 1
)
[(1− p)(
i + 1
N
rc− c) + p(
i+ 1
N
rc− c− d)]
+
(
Z − 1
N − 1
)−1(
k − 1
N − 1
)
(rc − c)
=
rc
N
[1 + (k − 1)
N − 1
Z − 1
]− c− dp+ dp
(
Z − 1
N − 1
)−1(
k − 1
N − 1
)
,
fP (k) =
(
Z − 1
N − 1
)−1 N−2∑
i=0
(
k − 1
i
)(
Z − k
N − i− 1
)
{(1− p)(
i + 1
N
rc− c)
+p[
i+ 1
N
rc− c− d− (N − 1− i)α]} +
(
Z − 1
N − 1
)−1(
k − 1
N − 1
)
(rc− c)
=
rc
N
[1 + (k − 1)
N − 1
Z − 1
]− c−
N − 1
Z − 1
(Z − k)pα− dp+ dp
(
Z − 1
N − 1
)−1(
k − 1
N − 1
)
, and
fD(k) =
(
Z − 1
N − 1
)−1 N−1∑
i=0
(
k
i
)(
Z − 1− k
N − 1− i
) i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
qj(1 − q)i−j [(1 − p)
i
N
rc + p(
i
N
rc− d− jβ)]
=
rc(N − 1)
N(Z − 1)
k − dp−
pqβ(N − 1)
(Z − 1)
k,
where we impose that the binomial coefficients satisfy(
k − 1
N − 1
)
= 0 if k < N .
Consequently, the average payoff of all the cooperators is
fX(k) = qfP (k) + (1 − q)fC(k)
=
rc
N
[1 + (k − 1)
N − 1
Z − 1
]− c−
N − 1
Z − 1
(Z − k)pqα
−dp+ dp
(
Z − 1
N − 1
)−1(
k − 1
N − 1
)
.
Next, we adopt the pair-wise comparison rule to study the
evolutionary dynamics, based on which we assume that player
y adopts the strategy of player z with a probability given by
the Fermi function
1
1 + exp[−s(Pz − Py)]
, (3)
where s is the intensity of selection that determines the level of
uncertainty in the strategy adoption process [45, 57]. Without
loosing generality, we use s = 2.0 in Fig. 5, Supplementary
Fig. S3, and Supplementary Fig. S5.
With these definitions, the probability that the number of
cooperators in the population increases or decreases by one is
T±(k) =
k
Z
Z − k
Z
[1 + e∓s[fX(k)−fD(k)]]−1. (4)
In finite populations, the gradient of selection for arbitrary
s is thus given by
G(k) ≡ T+(k)−T−(k) =
k
Z
Z − k
Z
tanh{
s
2
[fX(k)−fD(k)]}.
(5)
We further introduce the mutation-selection process into
the update rule by assuming that mutations occur between
cooperators and defectors with probability µ in each update
step [49, 58], and compute the stationary distribution as a key
quantity that determines the evolutionary dynamics in finite
well-mixed populations. We note that, in the presence of mu-
tations, the population will never fixate in any of the two pos-
sible absorbing states. Thus, the transition matrix of the com-
plete Markov chain is
M = [pm,n]
T , (6)
8where pm,n = 0 if |m−n| > 1, pm,m+1 = (1−µ)T+(m) +
µ(Z − m)/Z , pm,m−1 = (1 − µ)T
−(m) + µm/Z , and
pm,m = 1 − pm,m+1 − pm,m−1 otherwise. Accordingly, the
stationary distribution of the population, that is, the average
fraction of time the population spends in each of the Z + 1
states, is given by the eigenvector of the eigenvalue 1 of the
transition matrix M [59]. Specially, the unitized eigenvector
Π = [pi1, ···, piM+1]
T is derived explicitly for l = 1, ···,M+1
[60]:
pil =
λl∑M+1
m=1 λm
,
where λl = 1 if l = 1, and λl =
∏l−1
m=1
pm,m+1
pm+1,m
otherwise.
In addition, another central quantity is the average cooper-
ation level c¯, averaging over all possible states, weighted with
the corresponding stationary distribution [61, 62]. Accord-
ingly, c¯ is computed as
c¯ = SΠ/Z,
where S = [0, · · ·, Z] is the vector of population states.
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